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Abstract—Crowdfunding is a new funding method through 
which founders request small amounts of funding from a large 
number of people through an online platform. Crowdfunding 
facilitates a new type of social capital and exhibits a unique form 
of social dynamics, thus attracting the interest of sociologists 
and other social scientists. Previous studies have focused on 
social relationships in crowdfunding such as direct reciprocity 
and consider how they contribute to the success of funding. The 
social structure of crowdfunding, however, involves more 
complex social relationships and it may contribute to the success 
of a new venture or project in many ways. In this study, we focus 
on a specific type of triadic social structure, the buddy relation, 
which can be described as a relationship through which project 
founder x, who previously backed another founder z’s project, 
receives financial backing from the other backers of z’s project. 
We found that the buddy relation occurs significantly more 
often than randomly, concluding that this structure facilitates 
the gathering of financial backing and may contribute to the 
success of a crowdfunded project.  
Keywords—social network, triadic closure, focal closure, 
Monte Carlo simulation 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Crowdfunding is a funding method through which 
founders, to realize their goals, request funds from crowd 
comprising many and unspecified individuals through an 
online platform. Crowdfunding sites are used for a variety of 
projects, such as video games, free software, inventions, 
scientific research, environmental initiatives, social welfare, 
and political activities. Founders make their own proposals 
in public on crowdfunding sites and ask backers 
to contribute a small amount of money. The founder sets up 
a target amount of funding and offers returns for their 
support such as products, thank you letters, or 
advertisements of backers’ names as an 
acknowledgment. Individuals examine and compare 
proposals on the site. Those motivated select their favorite 
projects and decide the amount they want to pledge, and 
transfer money via micropayment. Finally, such backing 
expands via word of mouth on social networking services.  
Backers have the following two types of motivation: 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. The former is based on 
returns, that is, self-interest, whereas the latter is based on 
sympathy toward founders [1]. For example, those 
motivated intrinsically see the feelings of “connectedness” 
to a community as precious, via participating social 
interactions [2].  
The more attractive the proposal or return, the more 
fundraising is likely to be achieved. However, the major 
characteristic of crowdfunding is that new social capital 
emerges directly among people unknown to each other, and 
such social dynamics have attracted the interest of sociologists 
and other social scientists. Particularly, a large proportion of 
users in crowdfunding may interact with others not once but 
repeatedly; thus, their interactions form a type of social 
structure. Furthermore, present backers may become future 
founders and vice versa. This interdependent relationship 
creates the social dynamics of crowdfunding. For example, b’s 
previous experience of being backed by a may make b willing 
to back a this time; this is known as the reciprocity principle 
[3]. Social dynamics in crowdfunding, however, goes beyond 
simple reciprocity in crowdfunding, as discussed later in this 
study. 
Previous studies on crowdfunding have mainly focused on 
factors contributing to funding success. They have examined 
the contents of a project and the way it is presented to identify 
elements that are crucial for success, such as the “goal” (the 
target amount of funding), “deadline,” “news updates” 
(frequency of news updates), “Facebook likes” (number of 
Facebook likes), and length of explanation. Meanwhile, 
typographical errors usually result in failure [4]. 
Among the characteristics of crowdfunding, particularly 
interesting are those related to its social capital. References [4], 
[5], [6], and [7] explored the effects of founders’ social capital 
on the success of a funding initiative. Reference [4] showed 
that the possibility of success is significantly correlated to the 
number of Facebook likes, which they regarded as a founder’s 
social capital. Reference [5] showed that success is correlated 
to the social capital inside the crowdfunding site. As for the 
inside capital,  [6] showed that a founder who has received 
backing previously from many individuals is likely to be able 
to collect more backing for future initiatives. Reference [7] 
also showed that a founder who has backed many others is 
more likely to receive more backing. Particularly, [7] have 
confirmed that direct reciprocity between founders exists in 
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crowdfunding sites. As a related work, [8] showed that there 
is no indirect reciprocity among founders. 
These studies shed light on the important mechanisms of 
social capital that make it possible to fundraise through 
crowdfunding sites. However, they do not show a more 
complex social structure than a dyad such as direct reciprocity 
(however, see [8] and the discussion). In this study, we explore 
such a social structure and its dynamics. 
 
II. THEORY 
The questions explored in this study include the following: 
Why do backers back certain founders and not others? What 
is the effect of backing? How does previous backing by 
present founders contribute to gathering funds and thus the 
success of their projects? 
The act of backing can be considered as the emergence of 
a direct tie between a backer and a founder. Thus, the backing-
backed relationship forms a type of social network in 
crowdfunding sites. The network dynamics can be analyzed 
through social network theory [9] [10] [11] [12].  
One of the most common theories is the theory of 
reciprocity; that is, if your project was backed by someone 
previously, then you should back her if she is seeking funding 
for her project. In fact, [7] showed the existence of direct 
reciprocity. However, direct reciprocity cannot be seen as the 
major dynamics because the number of founders is very less 
when compared to backers. Other mechanisms should be 
considered. 
In social network theory, there are other candidates of 
mechanisms of tie creation apart from reciprocity. An 
important theory is that of triadic closure [13]. This theory 
states that you are likely to become friends with those who are 
friends of your friends. This dynamic has been found in 
various sites such as e-mail and social media [14] [15]. 
Furthermore, a shared focus tends to promote friendship 
between users. A focus here is defined as a “social, 
psychological, legal, or physical entity around which joint 
activities are organized (e.g., workplaces, voluntary 
organizations, hangouts, and families)” [16]. Reference [14] 
showed that class participation as a shared focus promoted 
friendship between college students. This is called focal 
closure.  
Based on the ideas of triadic and focal closure, this study 
proposes a new hypothesis, different from direct reciprocity, 
on how founders’ previous backing behaviors contribute to 
gathering funds. Our hypothesis is as follows: If x backs 
project Pz, then backers of project Pz (hereafter referred to as 
w) will be more likely to back x’s project Px, as shown in Fig. 
1.  
                                                
1 We interviewed D.S., who is the founder of a popular crowdfunding site 
in Japan. We conducted the interview on June 27, 2018. 
 
Fig. 1. Backers of project Pz (hereafter referred to as w) will be more 
likely to back x’s project Px, if x backs project Pz.  
This may be interpreted as the interaction of focal and 
triadic closures, as displayed in Fig. 2. First, this relationship 
may manifest focal closure because Pz is a project in which the 
joint activity (backing the project) is organized. Specifically, 
when x backs Pz, this backing relationship may express x’s 
shared concerns in the cause of the project launched by z. In 
the same way, w’s backing Pz may indicate w’s shared 
concerns with z. Hence, it is expected that x and w may share 
similar concerns in the cause of the project that x is trying to 
launch. In this way, Pz, as a focus, promotes shared concerns 
between x and w.  
However, only shared concerns may not guarantee a 
financial contribution to an unknown person. The w’s trust in 
x will be also required. Here, it must be noted that founder z 
may not only be a shared focus for x and w but may also be a 
mutual friend, which implies that a type of triadic closure may 
also be involved in this relationship. As a mutual friend, z may 
promote this trust relationship. We assume that this is 
attributed to the following story. When z knows that x is 
launching her project Px, z informs w of this and asks w to back 
x’s project Px. Subsequently, w may be convinced that x and 
her project Px is trustworthy because her friend z has 
guaranteed it.  
 
Fig. 2. Focal closure and triadic closure 
When this interaction of two mechanisms activates a 
friendship between x and w, and w backs x’s newly launched 
project Px, we refer to this as the “buddy effect.” 
This is not merely our speculation. We interviewed the 
founder of a crowdfunding site1 to confirm whether the above 
relationship is observed often. He told us that successful 
projects typically gather 1/3 of their funding from the 
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founder’s direct friends, 1/3 from friends of friends, and 1/3 
from others. Furthermore, he stated, 
 
As a rule of thumb, what a founder should do is not 
to ask for contributions from her direct friends, but to 
say to them, “Please let your friends know that I am 
launching my project.” 
 
This clearly refers to the process of closure that we 
hypothesized. However, this is just evidence; thus, 
quantitative evidence must be provided to verify this 
hypothesis, which we will do later in the study. His story 
suggests that our theoretical hypothesis is not merely 
speculative but worth exploring. 
In sum, our theory predicts that if x backed Pz, which was 
backed by w, then x is more likely to be backed by w in the 
future. As a corollary, if x backed Pz and a founder z has many 
backers, then x can gather more funding. 
 
III. DATA 
A. Data Collection and Organization 
Crowdfunding consists of four categories [17]: donations 
[18], rewards [4][5][19], debts [20], and equity [21][22]. 
Donations do not give backers any returns, whereas rewards, 
debts, and equity give backers non-monetary returns (e.g., a 
product or a thank you letter), dividends, and interest, 
respectively. Donations and rewards represent an essential 
aspect of crowdfunding because they have nothing to do with 
money. In the study, we collected data for these crowdfunding 
categories, particularly from Readyfor, Japan’s largest 
crowdfunding site. The data were collected from the site’s 
activities spanning from May 16, 2011 to September 5, 2017. 
The data are organized into the following two classes: user 
data and project data. The user data were collected from 
306,968 users. Several variables were included such as user 
ID, username, and user description. While users can be 
founders, they are not necessarily founders in this case; the 
majority of Readyfor users only provide backing and do not 
launch their own projects. We will refer to founders as the 
“community,” and users who only back others’ projects as the 
“crowd.” The project data consists of 6,559 different projects. 
The project information includes project ID, founder ID, 
project category, who commented on the project and when, 
and project deadline. Comment information is critical because 
it can be used to identify backing relationships and the dates 
of these links. In Readyfor, it is a norm to leave comments if 
you back a project. Since the commenting time is recorded, 
this can be used as a proxy for the time of the occurrence of 
the backing event. Project deadline is another valuable source 
of information. It specifies when the call for project funding 
ended. The problem is that it is impossible to specify the 
starting time of a project. As a proxy for this, we used the time 
of the first comment on a project as its starting time. 
By combining user and project data, we obtained a 
bipartite network whose nodes are projects and users and 
whose edges are backing relations from users to projects, 
which is shown in Fig. 3. The number of backer nodes is 
203,568 (this is smaller than the total number of users because 
the latter includes users who do not back at all). The number 
of project nodes is 6,559, and the number of edges is 279,676. 
There are two points to note in this case. First, project 
nodes have their founders. This implies that the user-project 
relationship also represents the user-founder relationship. 
Second, this is longitudinal network data; that is, edges have 
time stamps, and project life spans (from cut off to deadline) 
are also recorded. This time information is critical for our 
analysis. 
 
Fig. 3. The bipartite network of users and projects in Readyfor 
 
B. Basic Statistics and Preliminary Analysis 
The bipartite network created from backing relations in 
Readyfor had a very skewed degree of distribution, as 
expected. The basic statistics of project in-degree distribution 
are shown in Table I and Fig. 4. 
TABLE I.  BASIC STATISTICS OF PROJECT IN-DEGREE DISTRIBUTION 
Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% Max Mode 
42.6 75.3 0 5 21 53 1402 0 
 
 
Fig. 4. Log-log plot for project in-degree distribution 
The mode of this distribution is 0. Specifically, 411 
projects received no backing throughout their life spans. On 
the other hand, less than 25% of the projects obtained support 
from over 50 different backers, with the highest number 
reaching 1,402. This shows the skewedness of project in-
degree distribution.  
The user out-degree distribution was much more skewed, 
as shown in Table II and Fig. 5.  
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TABLE II.  BASIC STATISTICS OF USER OUT-DEGREE DISTRIBUTION 
Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% Max Mode 
1.4 3 1 1 1 1 733 1 
 
 
Fig. 5. Log-log plot for user out-degree distribution 
In fact, about 85% backers (172,232 backers) backed 
someone’s project only once. The number of two-time and 
three-time backers was 19,006 and 5,705, respectively. These 
numbers account for more than 96% of the backers. Very few 
people backed projects more than ten times (approximately, 
0.4% of the total backers).  
As the next step, we examined whether there was any 
prima facie evidence of the buddy effect. A buddy relation is 
observed in the following two conditions. 
1. Both x and w backed Pz. The backer that backed first (x or 
w) is irrelevant. 
2. After condition 1 is satisfied, w backs Px. 
 We can calculate the buddy ratio by dividing the number 
of case 2s by the number of case 1s. 
 
Buddy ratio = the num. of cases where w backs Px / the num. 
of cases where both x and w backed Pz 
 
 If the buddy ratio in Readyfor is significantly high, then it 
can be considered as prima facie evidence for the existence of 
the buddy effect in this platform.  
 First, we calculated the denominator of the buddy ratio, 
that is, the number of cases where both x and w backed Pz. The 
mean was 106.5. It must be noted that we excluded the 0-case 
in calculating the mean because when the denominator is 0, 
the buddy ratio cannot be calculated. This means that if you 
(x) are not the only backer of someone’s (z’s) project Pz, there 
are other 106.5 backers (w) of Pz, on an average, that are 
potential candidates for backing your project Px through the 
buddy relation. In real data, out of 106.5, 1.7 people backed 
Px, on an average. Thus, the buddy ratio is 0.031.  
Fig. 6 shows a typical example of a buddy relation. Y and 
W are a set of backers of Px and Pz, respectively. Px is backed 
by 𝑊 ∩ 𝑌 who backed Pz, which was also backed by X. 
 
 
Fig. 6. An example of the buddy relation 
Although the buddy relation appears to exist here, it is 
difficult to determine whether the raw ratio 0.031 indicates the 
existence of the buddy effect. The number may be generated 
through a purely random process. If w has a large out-degree, 
then w may back Px randomly without knowing that x backed 
the same Pz as itself. However, this relation is created purely 
accidentally and is not considered a genuine buddy relation. 
To exclude this possibility, a more sophisticated method must 
be employed. 
 
IV. METHOD 
To confirm whether the buddy effect works, we conducted 
a conditional uniform graph (CUG) hypothesis test [10]. In a 
CUG test, the null hypothesis is that the observed graph is 
uniformly generated and conditional on the assumed 
properties of nodes and edges. Under this hypothesis, many 
simulated graphs are generated via the Monte Carlo 
simulation. Subsequently, the statistics between the observed 
graph and simulated graphs are compared to examine whether 
there are any significant differences. 
For our null hypothesis, we must erase only the fact that w 
backed Pz while preserving backers’ tendencies to back and 
projects’ tendencies to attract backings. First, to preserve the 
backers’ tendencies, backers’ out-degrees were fixed; if 
backers a, b, and c backed 4, 8, and 2 times, respectively, in 
the observed network, then their out-degrees in the simulated 
network should remain the same at 4, 8, and 2, respectively. 
Second, to preserve the projects’ tendencies, backers choose 
projects to fund according to the “popularity” of the projects. 
The popularity in this sense is defined as the number of 
backers the project gathers in the real world. Thus, if project 
Pa gathered more backing than project Pb in the real world, 
project Pa is more likely to be chosen as a backing destination 
than project Pb. More details concerning this condition are 
provided below. 
The Monte Carlo simulation runs as follows. As we shall 
see below, all edges in the bipartite graph are randomly 
rewired according to the conditions mentioned above. Let us 
define the edge from backer a to project Pb as 𝑒%&', which has 
its own time stamp. Next, we must define a set of candidates 
of projects that are the target for rewiring as CS and denote 𝐶𝑆 	as 𝐾 . The actual 𝑒%&' is rewired and 𝑒%&,(𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒	𝑃, ∈𝐶𝑆)  is created in the simulated network. Pk is chosen 
probabilistically from CS—the set of candidates. CS is subject 
to the time constraint—all projects that exist when backer a 
backed project Pb are assigned as candidates. In other words, 
the life span of the candidate should include the creation time 
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of 𝑒%&4 . The assumption here is that backers would choose 
among the candidate projects that run simultaneously with 
project Pb at the time of backer 𝑎 backing it in the real world. 
Thus, the number of elements of CS as rewiring targets is 
much smaller than the number of total project nodes in the 
graph. 
 How is 𝑃,  chosen from CS? This process should be 
formalized by the popularity of projects. The in-degree of 𝑃, 
is denoted as 𝑠,. 𝑠, is the number of backers that the project 𝑃,  gathered in the real world. In the simulation, the backer 
chooses the backing destination probabilistically, according to 
the categorical distribution, 𝐶𝑎𝑡(𝑑|𝜇) = 𝜇,<=	>,?@ , 
 where 𝑑,  is the element of k-dimensional vector 𝑑  and its 
value is 0 or 1. Furthermore, 𝑑,>,?@ = 1. In other words, 𝑑, 
is the indicator of 𝑃, being chosen as the backing destination. 𝜇,  is the probability of being chosen, which is defined as 𝑠,/ 𝑠,>,?@ . In other words, 𝑃, is chosen with the probability 
of 𝑃,’s in-degree divided by the sum of in-degrees of all the 
candidates for the rewiring targets. 
Let us explain the procedure using a hypothetical example 
illustrated in Fig. 7. Consider rewiring the edge from 𝑎 to Pb. 
This backing occurred on July 1, 2016. Assume that a set of 
candidates for the rewiring targets consist of Pi, Pj, Pk, and Pl. 
It must be noted that life spans for every project include the 
date when the backing from 𝑎 to Pb occurred. The rewiring 
probability is determined in terms of each in-degree, that is, 
the rewiring probability for Pi is 4/25, Pj is 7/25, Pk is 12/25, 
and Pl is 2/25. In this case, the rewiring happened from 𝑎 to 
Pk. 
 
Fig. 7. A hypothetical example of the simulated network 
In sum, this simulation satisfies the two conditions 
discussed earlier. First, since each actual edge is rewired one 
by one, the out-degree distribution remains unchanged. 
Second, rewiring probability follows the categorical 
distribution, reflecting the popularity of each project. We 
conducted this simulation 100 times. 
 
V. RESULTS 
For each simulated network, we calculated the buddy ratio 
defined above. The distribution of the ratio over 100 trials is 
shown in Fig. 8. The mean of the ratio is 0.0011. 
Since the actual buddy ratio is 0.031, the null hypothesis 
that this occurs under the above two conditions is correct, with 
a probability of less than 0.01. Thus, it was concluded that the 
buddy effect exists in the crowdfunding site Readyfor. 
 
Fig. 8. The distribution of the buddy ratio over 100 trials 
  
VI. DISCUSSION 
This study proposed the buddy relation as a more 
complex structure than a dyad to explain the facilitation of 
backing for projects. As a similar work, [8], focusing on a 
transitive triplet, which is a type of hierarchical network 
(Fig. 9), showed that the triplets significantly exist in the 
network among founders of Kickstarter, the leading 
crowdfunding site in the world. Although the transitive 
triplet and buddy relation appear to have similar structures 
(Fig. 9), the two are different in the following ways. First, 
all nodes of the transitive triplet, x, z, and w, are founders, 
while the w from the buddy relation are pure backers. 
Second, the edges of the triplet, xz, wz, and wx, have no 
ordering in time because network data was aggregated over 
time, while the order of edges of the buddy relation is that 
wx occurs after xz and wz. Finally, this study showed fine 
micro structures among founders and backers, which reflects 
a causal relationship. 
 
  
Fig. 9. Transitive triplet and buddy relation. 
There are some limitations to the present study. First, the 
study focused on a single platform; thus, the generalizability 
of the finding is open for debate. A cross comparison of 
different crowdfunding platforms is a possible field for future 
research. Second, the study found that the buddy relation 
worked effectively, but this did not exclude the possibility that 
other social mechanisms are also effective in gathering the 
funding. For our next study, we aim to consider other 
mechanisms and compare their strengths with the buddy effect. 
Finally, although we showed that the buddy relation increased 
the probability of receiving backing, and this indicates that it 
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 6 
may contribute to the success in gaining funds eventually, 
direct evidence for this possibility was not provided. This 
factor should be demonstrated through future research. 
  
VII. CONCLUSION  
Crowdfunding can be a significant force of social 
change in modern society. Generally, cultural, environmental, 
and welfare issues have difficulty gaining funding because 
their marketability is poor (the failure of the market), and they 
do not serve as vote-gathering mechanisms (the failure of 
government). Conversely, besides marketing (the self-
aid) and governmental aid (the public aid), crowdfunding 
serves to provide funding to social entrepreneurs, as a form 
of mutual aid. As a result, crowdfunding can be regarded as a 
new institution responsible for the redistribution of resources; 
thus, crowdfunding has a high social significance. However, 
the transfer of money between people who have no existing 
or weak relations with each other is quite difficult. To 
establish trustworthy relations among people beyond direct 
reciprocity, both the triadic and focal closure conditions need 
to be present. The performance of a joint activity to support a 
project and the existence of mutual friends provide 
opportunities for the creation of sympathetic feelings and 
trust building. We found evidence that such an essential 
dynamic, the buddy effect, exists and helps founders to gain 
funding for their projects. However, the ratio of 0.031 is quite 
small. The next generation of crowdfunding should 
facilitate the establishment of the buddy relation. 
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